

MONROE D. KIAR
TOWN ATTORNEY
TOWN OF DAVIE
6191 SW 45th Street, Suite 6151A
Davie, Florida 33314
(954) 584-9770

TOWN ATTORNEY REPORT

DATE: January 28, 2003

FROM: Monroe D. Kiar

RE: Litigation Update

1. **Sunrise Water Acquisition Negotiations:** The Town requested competitive proposals for providing engineering services to conduct a western area utilities study. The Bid Selection Committee ranked URS as its first choice. At the Town Council Meeting of October 3, 2001, a resolution was approved selecting URS to provide engineering services for the western area utilities study and authorizing the Town Administrator to negotiate an agreement with URS for such services. The Town Attorney's Office has in the past, spoken with Mr. Cohen, who indicated that negotiations with URS have been ongoing. Mr. Cohen indicated that URS was requested to provide the Town with a Memorandum of Services setting forth their anticipated costs for each service to be rendered to enable the Town to determine the precise cost of the project and to determine if there are funds available to allow URS to conduct such services. A response has been received by the Town. The Town Attorney has also spoken with Mr. Dan Colabella, the Director of Public Utilities, who indicated that no agreement has been reached with URS as yet for conducting the engineering services for the western area utility study.
2. **Seventy-Five East, Inc. and Griffin-Orange North, Inc. v. Town of Davie:** A Final Order and Judgment Granting Petition for Common Law Certiorari was entered by Judge Patricia Cocalis in these two consolidated cases. Pursuant to the direction given to Mr. Burke by the Davie Town Council, an appeal of the Order entered by Judge Cocalis was filed with the 4th District Court of Appeal, but the 4th District Court of Appeal denied the Town's Petition for Writ of Certiorari on the Merits and Without Opinion, ordered that the matter be remanded back to the Town Council and required it to vote on the application based on the record as it existed prior to the filing of the Writ of Certiorari and in accordance with the Final Judgment entered by Judge Cocalis. The Petitioner requested the matter again be placed on the Town Council Agenda and the matter was again heard on October 2, 2002, by the Town Council. After a presentation by Mr. Burke, the applicant and Staff evidence was presented by those in attendance who spoke in favor and in opposition to the two

Petitions, the Town Council voted 4 to 1 to deny each petition. A Petition for Supplemental Relief to Enforce Mandate, or in the Alternative, Supplemental Complaint for Writ of Mandamus and for Writ of Certiorari has been filed by the Plaintiffs, Griffin-Orange North, Inc. and Seventy-Five East, Inc. with regard to the Quasi Judicial Hearing held before the Town of Davie on October 2, 2002. The Plaintiffs have filed these pleadings requesting that the Court order the Town of Davie to grant it the B-3 zoning and they are seeking a recovery of their attorneys' fees and court costs for their preparation and filing of this new Petition for Supplemental Relief to Enforce the Court's Mandate. Essentially, the pleadings request that the Circuit Court quash the Town Council's second denial of the Plaintiffs' zoning application and request that the Court compel approval of the B-3 zoning designation. The Plaintiffs have filed the pleadings with the same Court (Judge Cocalis) which previously entered a Final Judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs and have also filed an identical original action to cover all of their procedural basis. The Town Attorney's Office has reviewed the new pleadings filed by the Petitioner and has on several occasions, spoken with Mr. Burke, our special counsel, regarding their contents and litigation strategy. Mr. Burke previously indicated that the Petitioner filed a Motion to Consolidate the Petition for Supplemental Relief to Enforce Mandate as well as the second lawsuit it initiated, and requested that both lawsuits be heard before the original Judge in this case, Judge Cocalis, who is no longer in the Civil Trial Division, rather than Judge Robert Carney, who has taken over Judge Cocalis' prior case load. A hearing on the Petitioner's Motion to Consolidate the new Petition for Writ of Certiorari with its previously filed action was heard on December 17, 2002. Judge Carney granted the property owner's Motion to Consolidate, but denied the property owner's second Motion which was to transfer both actions back to Circuit Court Judge Patricia Cocalis. On January 15, 2003, the Town of Davie filed its Consolidated Response in Opposition to the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner. Mr. Burke has indicated that counsel for the property owners will have an opportunity to file a reply brief and thereafter, the matter will be set for oral argument before Circuit Court Judge Robert Carney. As indicated in a prior Memorandum to the Town Council, the response filed by the Town of Davie sets forth the fact that new evidence was presented for the Council's consideration, including the intense traffic congestion problems, which were anticipated that if a B-3 zoning application was applied; the addition to the location of a school across the street from the subject property; and a park nearby, namely the Linear Park, all of which constitute recent and novel factual issues that the Town Council could consider at the October 2, 2002 Town Council Meeting. Finally, the property owners have filed a Petition with the Court to stay the pending administrative re-zoning of the two subject properties initiated by the Town. Mr. Burke with whom the Town Attorney spoke this date, has indicated that the matter has been set down for hearing before Judge Carney on Thursday, January 30, 2003.

3. **MVP Properties, Inc.:** The Plaintiff previously filed a multi-count lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida where a Final Summary Judgment in favor of the Town and against Plaintiff, MVP Properties, Inc. was granted by the Court. MVP Properties, Inc. appealed to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals which later affirmed the decision of the lower court in favor of the Town of Davie and against the Plaintiff, MVP Properties, Inc. The Town is currently pursuing collection of the Judgment for costs that has been obtained from MVP Properties, Inc. In the meantime, MVP Properties, Inc. has instituted a new lawsuit in which it has filed a Complaint for Inverse Condemnation against the Town of Davie. The Florida League of Cities declined to represent the Town in this

latest lawsuit as actions for inverse condemnation are excluded from coverage by the League. Accordingly, the Town Attorney's Office has reviewed the Complaint for Inverse Condemnation filed by MVP Properties, Inc. against the Town of Davie and has timely filed a Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint. Said Motion to Dismiss had been scheduled for hearing for Tuesday, October 29, 2002, at 2:00 P.M. The Plaintiff however, requested that the hearing be continued to a later date and the hearing is now scheduled to be heard in February, 2003. The Town Attorney's Office is confident in the outcome of this litigation.

4. **Town of Davie v. Malka:** The Town Attorney's Office recently spoke with the Building Department and the Chief Building Official, Mr. Craig, confirmed that his staff is keeping a close eye on this particular property owner to ensure that the property owner is moving ahead with final completion of all additions of the structure as promised. During our last conversation, he indicated that there have been no recent complaints from the community.
5. **City of Pompano Beach, et al v. Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services:** As indicated in prior Litigation Reports, on May 24, 2002, Judge Fleet issued a 19 page Order on the Motion for Temporary Injunction in which he concluded that the Amendments regarding the Citrus Canker litigation enacted by the Florida Legislature as codified in Florida Statutes Section 581.184, was an invalid invasion of the constitutional safeguard contained in both the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Florida. The Judge ultimately entered a statewide Stay Order enjoining the Department of Agriculture from entering upon private property in the absence of a valid search warrant issued by an authorized judicial officer and executed by one authorized by law to do so. The Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services filed its Notice of Appeal seeking review by the 4th District Court of Appeal. The Department of Agriculture also filed a Motion with the 4th District Court of Appeal seeking that the appellate procedures be expedited, and a motion in which there was a suggestion for "bypass" certification to the Supreme Court of Florida. The Department of Agriculture contended that in light of the gravity and emergency nature of the issues, the matter should be certified by the 4th District Court of Appeal directly to the Supreme Court for its adjudication since the Department of Agriculture anticipated that regardless as to how the 4th District Court of Appeal rules on the matter, it would in fact be appealed by either the Department of Agriculture or by the County and coalition of cities to the Supreme Court of Florida for final adjudication. The 4th District Court of Appeal in fact for only the fourth time in its history, did certify this matter directly to the Florida Supreme Court for adjudication. The Florida Supreme Court however, refused to hear this matter at this stage and remanded it back to the 4th District Court of Appeal for further proceeding. Both the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and the County and coalition of cities have filed their respective Appellate Briefs. The Florida Department of Agriculture recently filed a Reply Brief to the Brief filed by Broward County and the coalition of cities. The Town Attorney, along with several other municipal attorneys, at the request of the Chief Appellate Attorney for Broward County, Andrew Meyers, attended the oral argument in these proceedings before a three judge panel at the 4th District Court of Appeal Courthouse in Palm Beach County on December 4, 2002. Oral argument was originally scheduled to be 20 minutes per side, but exceeded more than 1 hour. The Judges asked numerous poignant questions of both the attorneys for the Department of Agriculture and those present representing the coalition of cities, and appeared to express some concern regarding the possible evasion of constitutional safeguards afforded to the

citizens of Florida by the employees of the Department of Agriculture entering upon the private backyard properties of the citizens. On January 15, 2003, the 4th District Court of Appeal issued its opinion relevant to the appeal filed by the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services for the Order of Judge Fleet. The 4th District Court of Appeal found that Section 581.184 of the Florida Statutes (2002) requiring the removal of citrus trees within the 1900 feet of a tree infected with canker did not violate due process and therefore, was constitutional. The 4th District Court of Appeal also found Section 933.07(2) of the Florida Statutes allowing area wide search warrants unconstitutional and a violation of the 4th Amendment. The Court however, did rule that multiple properties to be searched may be included in a single search warrant and the issuance of such a warrant should be left to the discretion of the issuing magistrate. The Town Attorney's Office has been advised by the Chief Appellate Attorney for the County, that the County and coalition of cities will be appealing the ruling of the 4th District Court of Appeal to the Florida Supreme Court for final adjudication.

6. **Christina MacKenzie Maranon v. Town of Davie:** The Town of Davie filed a Motion for Summary Final Judgment on behalf of the Town of Davie and Police Officer Quentin Taylor seeking to dismiss both parties as defendants in this lawsuit. In response, the Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint naming the Town of Davie only as a defendant. Officer Taylor was no longer named a party to these proceedings. The Florida League of Cities attorney assigned to this case has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint and has advised the Town Attorney's Office that if it is not granted, he will again file a Motion for Summary Judgment. On this date January 28, 2003, the Town Attorney conferred with Attorney Rick McDuff regarding the status of this case. Mr. McDuff advised the Town Attorney that the Judge has still not yet ruled upon the Town's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. From my several discussions with Mr. McDuff, he continues to be confident that the case will ultimately be dismissed by the Court in its entirety. In the meantime, the Plaintiffs have done little to move the case forward.
7. **Spur Road Property:** As indicated by Mr. Willi to the Town Council at its meeting of January 2, 2003, Mr. Burke advised Mr. Willi that the 4th District Court of Appeal had affirmed the decision of the Florida Department of Transportation to accept the bid of Kevin Carmichael, Trustee, for the sale and purchase of the property which forms the subject matter of the State Road 84 Spur property litigation.
8. **Peter Castagna v. Officers Brito and Williams:** Peter Castagna filed a lawsuit against Officers Daniel Brito and Paul Williams alleging an action for damages pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. 1983, for alleged false imprisonment, battery and alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress. The outside legal counsel assigned by the Florida League of Cities to defend the police officers at the League's expense, filed a Motion to Dismiss the lawsuit instituted by Mr. Castagna. Prior to the Motion being heard, the attorneys for Mr. Castagna filed an Amended Complaint and our special outside legal counsel has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. The Town Attorney's Office spoke with Mr. McDuff on this date, January 28, 2003, and was advised that the Motion to Dismiss is still pending. In the meantime, the case has been scheduled for trial for May, 2003. Mr. McDuff has indicated that the parties are continuing to conduct further discovery and will continue to do so until the cutoff date in March. At that time, Mr. McDuff has indicated that his office will

be ready to file a Motion for Summary Judgment. As indicated in prior reports, it is the belief of our Florida League of Cities Attorney, Mr. McDuff, that it is very questionable that the police conduct on June 25, 1999 resulted in the problems which the Plaintiff contends he now has as a result of the incident of June 25, 1999, and that the evidence will show that there was no improper conduct by the police officers in this matter.

9. **Covenant House of Florida, Inc. v. Town of Davie:** This matter has been settled whereby the Town Council entered into a Contract for the purchase of the real property which is the subject of the lawsuit and as part of the settlement proposal upon completion of the purchase, the lawsuit would be dismissed. The closing on the subject property located on Orange Drive took place on Thursday, November 14, 2002, and the Town is now the owner of the property. On December 30, 2002, The Town Attorney's Office received the Final Order of Dismissal signed by Judge Robert B. Carney and forwarded it to the Town Administrator. The Deed to the subject property was thereafter filed with Broward County for recording and upon receipt of the recorded document, as well as the Owners' Title Insurance Policy, both were forwarded to the Town Administrator and Clerk for safekeeping.
10. **Pelican Coast Holdings, Inc. and William Cuthbertson v. Town of Davie:** A Petition for Certiorari was served upon the Town along with an Order to Show Cause signed by Judge Burnstein requiring the Town of Davie to show cause why the relief requested in the Petition for Certiorari should not be granted. On July 22, 2002, Appellee, Town of Davie, filed its response to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Pelican Coast Holdings, Inc. and William Cuthbertson have since filed their Reply Brief. Oral argument in this matter was held on October 3, 2002 and thereafter, both side submitted Memorandum of Law in support of their respective positions. On October 28, 2002, Judge Burnstein issued her Order in this case. The Court granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and quashed the condition imposed by the Town Council at its May 15, 2002 Meeting that the owner of the property obtained a "special permit" from the Council, if the owner seeks to serve alcoholic beverages at the site. The Court does however, make clear that the owners and users of the property are bound by the separation requirements for alcoholic establishments, but the Court proposes that the Town would be able to monitor the owner's compliance through its occupational licensing regulations. The Court has also ruled that the Petitioner is entitled to recover its attorney's fees in prosecuting the appeal. A copy of Judge Burnstein's Order of October 28, 2002 has been previously provided to the Mayor and Councilmembers. At the first meeting in November of the Davie Town Council, the Council authorized Mr. Burke's firm to file the necessary paperwork to challenge Judge Burnstein's Order of October 28, 2002. Pursuant to the Council's instructions, a Petition for Writ of Certiorari was filed on behalf of the Town of Davie with the 4th District Court of Appeal. The Petition was reviewed by a 3 judge panel of the 4th District Court of Appeal and the Town Attorney has been advised by Mr. Burke that the Court has denied the Town's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, but also denied the request of the property owner for an award of attorney's fees on the appellate level. The issue of what amount is to be awarded to the Petitioner with regard to attorney's fees on the Circuit Court level is still in issue.
11. **DePaola v. Town of Davie:** Plaintiff DePaola filed a lawsuit against the Town of Davie and the Town filed a Motion to Dismiss. The Motion to Dismiss was heard by Judge Burnstein who requested that both sides file Memoranda of Law in support of their positions and she

took the case under advisement. Both sides did file their Memoranda of Law in support of their positions on the Town's Motion to Dismiss, and on November 13, 2002, the Court entered an Order granting the Town's Motion to Dismiss and entered an Order of Dismissal.

The Court found that Mr. DePaola had administrative remedies as a career service employee, either by pursuing a civil service appeal or by a grievance procedure established under a collective bargaining agreement, but he had failed to pursue his administrative remedies. A copy the Court's Order of November 13, 2002, has been previously provided to the Town Council for its review. The Plaintiff DePaola filed a motion with the Court for re-hearing of the Town's Motion to Dismiss, which motion was denied by the Trial Court.

12. **Southern Homes of Davie, LLC v. Davie (Charleston Oaks Plat) Case No. 02-015674 (11):** The Town was served with a Summons and Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunction and Petition for Writ of Mandamus with regard to Case Number 02-015674 (11) instituted by Southern Homes of Davie, LLC against the Town of Davie relevant to the "Charleston Oaks Plat". The Florida League of Cities has accepted responsibility for providing a defense to the Town of Davie relevant to this lawsuit and has assigned the case to Attorney Michael Burke. The Plaintiff is seeking both equitable relief and monetary damages against the Town. The Plaintiff is alleging that they have suffered injury as a result of the Town's refusal to process, review and/or approve its Site Plan Application while the Zoning in Progress has been in effect. They are seeking an Order declaring that the Plaintiff is entitled to approval of its Site Plan Application and that the Town be estopped to apply the "Zoning in Progress"; declaring that the Zoning in Progress does not exist and/or does not apply to Plaintiff's Site Plan Application and/or Plaintiff's property, and other relief. Since then, the Plaintiff has filed a second companion case also seeking a Declaratory Judgment and Injunction and Petition for Mandamus against the Town of Davie with regard to the "Flamingo Plat". This too, has been accepted for defense by the Florida League of Cities. Both cases have been since consolidated for discovery purposes and Mr. Burke's firm has filed its response to each Complaint filed in the two lawsuits. Since the last Town Attorney's Litigation Update report, there has been discussions between Mr. Burke and the Attorneys for the Plaintiffs regarding the potential dismissal of both lawsuits in light of the Town Council's recent action approving the code changes pertaining to the Zoning in Progress. A written proposal from Attorney Spencer was received, but it was extremely broad and encompassed far more than the two parcels of real property which are known as the Charleston Oaks Plat and the Flamingo Plat. The Town Attorney and Mr. Burke reviewed the proposed stipulation together and Mr. Burke indicated that it was not acceptable in its current form and he would contact Attorney Spencer regarding anticipated changes to what appeared to be an overly broad settlement agreement.
13. **Asset Management Consultants of Virginia, Inc. v. Town of Davie:** The Town of Davie has been sued by Asset Management Consultants of Virginia, Inc., who are seeking a refund of a public service fee imposed on certain property owners by the Town pursuant to Ordinance No. 99-35 of the Town Code. The Town filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint along with a Memorandum of Law in support of the Town's position. The Town's position is that at the time of the passage of Ordinance No. 99-35 of the Davie Town Code, it was properly initiated and therefore, the Plaintiff is not entitled to a refund of the public services fees which were subsequently declared unconstitutional and contrary to Section 192.042 of the Florida Statutes by the Florida Supreme Court in 1999. The Town of Davie's Motion to

dismiss the lawsuit was heard on Friday, November 15, 2002, and after Judge Greene heard lengthy oral argument on both sides, the Court granted the Town of Davie's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. The Judge granted our Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice as to Count II, which was a claim by the Plaintiff against the Town of Davie for unjust enrichment with regard to the Town of Davie's collection of the public service fee which was subsequently ruled unconstitutional. The Judge also granted the Town's Motion to Dismiss Counts I and III in which the Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment and a refund of the public services fee that was collected relevant to the Plaintiffs. The Judge also struck with prejudice that portion of Count III which sought prejudgment interest against the Town if the Plaintiff is successful. The Judge did give the Plaintiff 20 days in which to amend Count I and the balance of Count III. A copy of the Court's Order of November 15, 2002, was previously forwarded to the Town for distribution to the Mayor and Councilmembers. The Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Extension of Time to submit their Amended Complaint and their request was granted. The Amended Complaint was ultimately filed by the Plaintiffs on January 3, 2003, and Mr. Johnson indicated to the Town Attorney this date that his office has just filed an appropriate response to the Amended Complaint, namely another Motion to Dismiss. Mr. Johnson is confident in the outcome of this litigation.

14. **Michael Biglen v. Town of Davie:** The Plaintiff has sued Florida Power & Light Company, the Town of Davie and several other defendants. The Plaintiff alleges that he made contact with an overhead power line owned by Florida Power & Light Company while he was on the premises of a private land owner. Nevertheless, he asserts claims for negligence against the Town claiming a duty owed by the Town to enforce compliance with one of its ordinances. The Town has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a cause of action for premises liability against the Town of Davie, that the Plaintiff's claims are barred by sovereign immunity, and seeking an award from the Plaintiff of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Florida Statutes §57.105. It is the Town's position that the Plaintiff has asserted claims against the Town without a good faith basis in doing so and that no facts or legal theories support the Plaintiff's claims and therefore, based on the circumstances, the Town is entitled to an award of its attorney's fees and costs. On January 16, 2003, the Court heard the Motion to Dismiss filed on behalf of the Town of Davie to dismiss the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. After hearing argument of counsel and reviewing the case law provided, the Court reserved ruling. Mr. Johnson has indicated that he is hopeful of receiving a decision by the Court shortly.
15. **City of Cooper City v. Town of Davie:** The City of Cooper City has filed a lawsuit for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief and Alternative Petitions for Writ of Quo Warranto and Certiorari alleging that a recent ordinance and a recent resolution relevant to annexation are invalid. The Town Attorney's Office has prepared an appropriate Motion to Dismiss should the Town's insurance carrier refuse to provide legal defense to this action. The Risk Manager believes that the new carrier will not provide legal defense. If, however, such defense is provided by the insurance carrier, then the Town Attorney's Office will gladly share its legal research and its Motion to Dismiss with any such insurance company attorney.